Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers
Volume 30

Issue 2

Article 6

4-1-2013

On Whitcomb's Grounding Argument For Atheism
Joshua Rasmussen
Andrew Cullison
Daniel Howard-Snyder

Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy

Recommended Citation
Rasmussen, Joshua; Cullison, Andrew; and Howard-Snyder, Daniel (2013) "On Whitcomb's Grounding
Argument For Atheism," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 30 :
Iss. 2 , Article 6.
DOI: 10.5840/faithphil201330215
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol30/iss2/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange.

ON WHITCOMB’S
GROUNDING ARGUMENT FOR ATHEISM
Joshua Rasmussen, Andrew Cullison, and Daniel Howard-Snyder

Dennis Whitcomb argues that there is no God on the grounds that (i) God is
supposed to be omniscient, yet (ii) nothing could be omniscient due to the
nature of grounding. We give a formally identical argument that concludes
that one of the present co-authors does not exist. Since he does exist, Whitcomb’s argument is unsound. But why is it unsound? That is a difficult question. We venture two answers. First, one of the grounding principles that the
argument relies on is false. Second, the argument equivocates between two
kinds of grounding: instance-grounding and quasi-mereological grounding. Happily, the equivocation can be avoided; unhappily, avoidance comes
at the price of a false premise.

I. Parody
One way to argue for atheism is to argue that one of the properties God
is supposed to have could not be had by anything. Thus, for example,
one might argue that there is no God because God is supposed to be
omnipotent and nothing could be omnipotent due to a suitably subtle
version of the paradox of the stone. And there are other well-known arguments of this form. Continuing in this grand tradition, Dennis Whitcomb
argues that there is no God because God is supposed to be omniscient and
nothing could be omniscient due to the nature of grounding and its relation to knowledge.1 Whitcomb offers two versions of his argument, one
informal and the other formal. In what follows we assess both versions.
The informal version goes like this:
Suppose for reductio that someone is omniscient. Then his being omniscient
is partly grounded by his knowing that he is omniscient (which is one of
the knowings that helps make him all-knowing). And his knowing that he
is omniscient is partly grounded by his being omniscient (for knowledge is
partly grounded by the truth of what is known). Since partial grounding
is transitive, it follows that his being omniscient is partly grounded by his
being omniscient. But this result is absurd, for nothing can partly ground
itself. Hence our reductio assumption is false. That is to say, it is false that

1
Dennis Whitcomb, “Grounding and Omniscience,” forthcoming, Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 4 (2012).
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someone is omniscient. But if God exists, then he is omniscient. Therefore,
God does not exist.2

Is the informal version of Whitcomb’s grounding argument for atheism
sound? To answer that question, consider the following definition and
assumption:
Definition. “X is daniscient” =df. “X knows all and only whatever propositions Dan Howard-Snyder happens to know.”
Assumption. One of the propositions that Dan Howard-Snyder happens
to know is that Dan Howard-Snyder is daniscient.
Now consider the following parody argument:
Suppose for reductio that Dan Howard-Snyder is daniscient. Then his
being daniscient is partly grounded by his knowing that he is daniscient (which is one of the knowings that helps make him daniscient).
And his knowing that he is daniscient is partly grounded by his being
daniscient (for knowledge is partly grounded by the truth of what is
known). Since partial grounding is transitive, it follows that his being
daniscient is partly grounded by his being daniscient. But this result
is absurd, for nothing can partly ground itself. Hence our reductio assumption is false. That is to say, it is false that Dan Howard-Snyder
is daniscient. But if Dan Howard-Snyder exists, then he is daniscient.3
Therefore, Dan Howard-Snyder does not exist.
It appears that if the informal version of Whitcomb’s grounding argument
for atheism is sound, then Dan Howard-Snyder does not exist. But he does
exist. (If you doubt this, run the argument using your own name.) Therefore, the informal version of Whitcomb’s argument is unsound.
Informal versions of an argument are often bettered by their formal
versions. Here is Whitcomb’s formal version of the argument, ever so
slightly altered:
Let “↤” abbreviate “is partly grounded by” and let “[P]” abbreviate
“the fact that P.” Now consider the following four true principles:
TRANSITIVITY: For all facts X, Y, and Z: if X ↤ Y and Y ↤ Z, then X ↤ Z.
IRREFLEXIVITY: For every fact F, it is not the case that F ↤ F.

TRUTH GROUNDS KNOWLEDGE (TGK): For every fact F of the form
S knows that K, F ↤ [K].

∃∀ GROUNDING: Every existential-universal (∃∀) fact ↤ each of its
instances.
Ibid., 5 (manuscript).
This is true because both the antecedent and the consequence are true (which is not to
say, of course, that the conditional is necessarily true).
2
3
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To illustrate ∃∀ GROUNDING, suppose that it is a fact that someone
is loved by everyone: ∃x∀y(y loves x). Call that fact “L.” Further, suppose that Igor is loved by everyone, and that Sam and Pat are among
the people who exist. Then ∃∀ GROUNDING tells us that L is partly
grounded by [Sam loves Igor], and partly grounded by [Pat loves Igor].
That is to say, it tells us that L is partly grounded by both of these
two instances it has—these two as well as many others. (We trust the
intended meaning of “instance” is sufficiently clear from the examples.
For a more precise definition, see Whitcomb’s Appendix 2.)
These four principles are inconsistent with
OMNISCIENCE: It is a fact that there is some being x such that for
every fact f, x knows f.
Proof: Let “G” name one of the individuals who knows every fact, according to OMNISCIENCE, and let “O” name [there is some being x
such that for every fact f, x knows f]. Then:
1. [G knows O] is an instance of O (by OMNISCIENCE)
2. O ↤ [G knows O] (by 1 and ∃∀ GROUNDING)

3. [G knows O] ↤ O (by OMNISCIENCE and TGK)
4. O ↤ O (by 2, 3, and TRANSITIVITY)
5. ¬(O ↤ O) (by IRREFLEXIVITY)
Contradiction (4, 5)

Since God exists only if OMNISCIENCE is true, and OMNISCIENCE
is inconsistent with our four true principles of grounding, God does
not exist.4
What should we make of this argument?
Well, consider the following parody argument:
TRANSITIVITY, IRREFLEXIVITY, TGK, and ∃∀ GROUNDING are all
true and inconsistent with
DANISCIENCE: It is a fact that there is some being x such that for every
fact f known by Dan Howard-Snyder, x knows f.

Proof: Let “Dan Howard-Snyder” name one of the individuals who
knows every fact that Dan Howard-Snyder knows, according to DANISCIENCE, and let “D” name [there is some being x such that for every
fact f known by Dan Howard-Snyder, x knows f]. Then:
1. [Dan Howard-Snyder knows D] is an instance of D (by DANISCIENCE)
4

Ibid., 6–7, 14 (manuscript).
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2. D ↤ [Dan Howard-Snyder knows D] (by 1 and ∃∀ GROUNDING)

3. [Dan Howard-Snyder knows D] ↤ D (by DANISCIENCE and TGK)
4. D ↤ D (by 2, 3, and TRANSITIVITY)
5. ¬(D ↤ D) (by IRREFLEXIVITY)
Contradiction (4, 5)

Since Dan Howard-Snyder exists only if DANISCIENCE is true,
and DANISCIENCE is inconsistent with our four true principles of
grounding, Dan Howard-Snyder does not exist.
It appears that if the formal version of Whitcomb’s grounding argument
for atheism is sound, then Dan Howard-Snyder does not exist. But he does
exist. Therefore, the formal version of Whitcomb’s argument is unsound.
II. Diagnosis
We conclude that Whitcomb’s grounding argument for atheism, in both
its informal and formal versions, is unsound. But why is it unsound? This
is not an easy question to answer. Still, we venture an answer. In fact,
we venture two. It is unsound because ∃∀ GROUNDING is false and/or
because it commits the fallacy of equivocation. We explain each answer
in turn.
Recall that, according to ∃∀ GROUNDING, every ∃∀ fact is partly
grounded by each of its instances. It’s not too difficult, however, to get in a
frame of mind where one might well think one can see that there are some
∃∀ facts that are not partly grounded by each of their instances. Indeed,
we only need look to omniscience’s near neighbor omnipotence to find
a candidate. Omnipotence, as one might expect, has to do with power,
particularly the ability to bring about every metaphysically possible state
of affairs (roughly). Suppose, just for the sake of illustration, that
OMNIPOTENCE: It is a fact that there is some being x such that for
every metaphysically possible state of affairs s, x is able to bring about
s.
OMNIPOTENCE is an ∃∀ fact. Thus, if, as ∃∀ GROUNDING tells us, every
∃∀ fact is partly grounded by each of its instances, then (say) Theia’s ability
to bring about every metaphysically possible state of affairs is partly
grounded by, for example, her ability to bring it about that the freezing
level drops at Goat Rocks tonight.5 But this implication seems false. Indeed,
the reverse seems true: Theia’s ability to bring it about that the freezing
level drops at Goat Rocks tonight is partly grounded by her ability to bring
5
See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goat_Rocks. “The Goat Rocks are a series of rugged
volcanic peaks in the Cascade Range, roughly between Mount Rainier and Mount Adams
in southern Washington state. They are named after the numerous mountain goats which
live in the area, and are at the core of the eponymous Goat Rocks Wilderness.”
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about every metaphysically possible state of affairs. In that case, if we add
IRREFLEXIVITY—according to which, for every fact F, it is not the case
that F is partly grounded by F—∃∀ GROUNDING turns out false.
One might agree that ∃∀ GROUNDING is false in its full generality and
that omnipotence shows that this is so, but nevertheless insist that it applies to omniscience. This would be a mistake, however. For suppose that
omnipotence shows that ∃∀ GROUNDING is false in its full generality.
Now, just as omnipotence has to do with power, so does omniscience—
cognitive power, particularly the ability to know all facts (roughly, and in
keeping with Whitcomb’s usage). It seems that what we said about omnipotence is rightly said about omniscience. Theia’s ability to know all facts is
not partly grounded by, for example, her ability to know that the freezing
level will drop at Goat Rocks tonight. Rather, her ability to know that
the freezing level will drop at Goat Rocks tonight is partly grounded by
her ability to know all facts. Add IRREFLEXIVITY and ∃∀ GROUNDING
turns out false with respect to omniscience.
So much for ∃∀ GROUNDING. We now turn to equivocation. TGK
and ∃∀ GROUNDING seem to be about different grounding relations.
Recall that according to TGK, for every fact F of the form S knows that
K, F is partly grounded by [K]. Here the grounding relation seems to involve something being grounded by its parts or constituents. Knowledge
is partly grounded by the fact known in that it is a part or constituent
of knowledge. Part of what it is to for us to know that the Knife’s Edge
is in the Goat Rocks Wilderness is for it to be the case that the Knife’s
Edge is in the Goat Rocks Wilderness; it’s being the case that the Knife’s
Edge is in the Goat Rocks Wilderness is a constituent of our knowing that
the Knife’s Edge is in the Goat Rocks Wilderness. The grounding here
appears to be mereological or, better, quasi-mereological.6 (We leave the
quasi-qualification implicit from here on out.) Not so for ∃∀ GROUNDING.
According to ∃∀ GROUNDING, every ∃∀ fact is partly grounded by each
of its instances. Here the grounding relation seems to involve facts being
grounded by their instances. For example, [∃x(x is a person)] is partly
grounded by [Barack Obama is a person]; and, to draw on Whitcomb’s
illustrative hypothetical case, [∃x∀y(y loves x)] is partly grounded by [Sam
loves Igor], [Pat loves Igor], and so on.
Now, it might be tempting to think of instances as in some sense parts
of the facts they instance. Perhaps this temptation underwrites some of
the appeal of ∃∀ GROUNDING. However, some instances cannot be so
thought of. Take, for example, [∃x(x is a fact)]. Call it “E.” Notice that [E is
a fact] is an instance of E but [E is a fact] is not a part or constituent of E.
If anything, it’s the other way around: E is a part or constituent of [E is a

6
Karen Bennett calls this sort of relation a “building” grounding relation in “Construction Area (No Hard Hat Required),” Philosophical Studies 154:1, 79–104. See also Whitcomb’s
commentary on TGK, pages 11–13 (manuscript), where he characterizes the grounding relation involved in TGK in mereological, or quasi-mereological, terms.
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fact]. Thus, from a mereological point of view, [E is a fact] might well be
partly grounded by E, but E is not an instance of [E is a fact].
The same goes for the ∃∀ facts on the table. [Dan Howard-Snyder
knows D] is an instance of D but it is not a part or constituent of D. That
is, [Dan Howard-Snyder knows D] is an instance of [there is some being x
such that for every fact f known by Dan Howard-Snyder, x knows f], but
the former is not a part or constituent of the latter. Likewise, [G knows
O] is an instance of O but it is not a part or constituent of O. That is, [G
knows O] is an instance of [there is some being x such that for every fact f,
x knows f], but the former is not a part or constituent of the latter.
The upshot, then, is this: the instance grounding relation is not identical with the mereological grounding relation.
Whitcomb’s grounding argument for atheism and our parody argument make use of both types of grounding. Here’s the relevant portion of
the formal version of Whitcomb’s argument:
2. O ↤ [G knows O] (by 1 and ∃∀ GROUNDING)

3. [G knows O] ↤ O (by OMNISCIENCE and TGK)
4. O ↤ O (by 2, 3, and TRANSITIVITY)

Here’s the relevant portion of our parity argument:
2. D ↤ [Dan Howard-Snyder knows D] (by 1 and ∃∀ GROUNDING)

3. [Dan Howard-Snyder knows D] ↤ D (by OMNISCIENCE and TGK)
4. D ↤ D (by 2, 3, and TRANSITIVITY)

The relation expressed by “↤” in each version of (2) is the instance
grounding relation, whereas the relation expressed by “↤” in each version of (3) is the mereological grounding relation. Thus, each argument
equivocates. Consequently, (4) of each argument doesn’t follow from (2)
and (3), at least not by TRANSITIVITY, whose application demands a
single relation and not just a single symbol or form of words.
Can equivocation be avoided? We think so, but only if there is a general grounding relation that encompasses both mereological grounding
and instance grounding. However, if there is such a general grounding
relation, then—since mereological grounding (or whatever grounding is
involved in TGK) dictates that [Dan Howard-Snyder knows D] is partly
grounded by D, which, recall, is [there is some being x such that for every
fact f known by Dan Howard-Snyder, x knows f], and instance grounding
dictates that D is partly grounded by [Dan Howard-Snyder knows D]—it
grounds in both directions, from D to [Dan Howard-Snyder knows D]
and from [Dan Howard-Snyder knows D] to D. Now: either this general
grounding relation is transitive or it is not. If it is transitive, then D is
partly grounded by D, in which case it is not irreflexive and Whitcomb’s
IRREFLEXIVITY is false. If, on the other hand, it is not transitive, then
Whitcomb’s TRANSITIVITY is false. Equivocation can be avoided in our
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parity argument, therefore, but only at the usual price: a false premise.
Mutatis mutandis, the same goes for Whitcomb’s grounding argument for
atheism.7
Azusa Pacific University
SUNY Fredonia
Western Washington University

7
For comments on previous drafts, thanks to Ben Corey, Tom Flint, Frances HowardSnyder, Hud Hudson, Ryan Wasserman, Dennis Whitcomb, and an anonymous referee.

